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JEFFREY SELBIN, JEANNE CHARN, ANTHONY ALFIERI  & STEPHEN 
WIZNER 
Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to 
Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research 
Imperative 
introduction 
How should we deliver legal services to low-income clients in need? 
How should we allocate scarce legal resources among deserving clients? 
How can we increase access to justice more generally? 
 
As legal services lawyers and clinical law professors who have spent the 
bulk of our careers in neighborhood-based antipoverty programs, we grapple 
constantly with these individual, institutional, and systemic challenges. Legal 
needs in low-income communities far outstrip our ability to meet them, so we 
develop gatekeeping mechanisms to manage client demand and expectations.1 
Among eligible clients, we face seemingly intractable choices about whom to 
serve and how much to serve them.2 While we struggle with individual delivery 
and programmatic allocation decisions, we also strive to expand access to 
justice systemically. 
James Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak’s provocative article3—reporting 
the results of a randomized controlled trial evaluating legal assistance to low-
income clients at the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau (HLAB)—forces us to confront 
 
1.  See Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness 
in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978). 
2.  See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic for Legal Services Practice, 37 UCLA 
L. REV. 1101 (1990). 
3.  D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: 
What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118 (2012). 
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how little we know about these questions. Studying the outcomes of appeals 
from initial denials of unemployment insurance (UI) benefit claims, they 
asked: what difference does legal representation make?4 They find that “an 
offer of HLAB representation had no statistically significant effect on the 
probability that a claimant would prevail, but that the offer did delay the 
adjudicatory process.”5 That is, not only was an offer of legal assistance 
immaterial to the case outcome, but it may have harmed clients’ interests. 
In Part I of this Essay, we describe the Greiner and Pattanayak study and 
the skeptical reaction it initially received from many of our colleagues. We then 
offer a more optimistic reading. Building on this alternative reading, we argue 
in Part II that empirical research can inform service delivery, resource 
allocation, and access-to-justice questions. In fact, in light of the growing 
demand for legal services and shrinking supply, we contend that such research 
has become imperative. In Part III, we discuss recent developments in law 
schools, the professions, and policymaking that provide support, 
infrastructure, and incentives for such research. We conclude with a call for 
legal services lawyers and clinical law professors to embrace an expansive, 
empirical research agenda. 
i .  reading greiner and pattanayak 
Legal services lawyers, clinicians, and policymakers should read Greiner 
and Pattanayak’s work with care.6 The study cannot easily be dismissed on 
methodological grounds or because we do not like what it suggests about our 
work. At the same time, the study does not require us to surrender our belief in 
the efficacy of legal representation or to abandon the wisdom we have 
accumulated over decades of practice. Instead, it creates space for new ideas, 
debate, and action. 
In this Part, we summarize the study’s design, findings, and conjectures 
about causal mechanisms. Next, we offer a typology of some of the initial 
skeptical responses to the piece. We then turn to our own, more hopeful read 
of the study’s findings. This view has been largely absent from early reactions 
and suggests the need for much more work of this kind. 
 
4.  See id. at 2121. 
5.  Id. at 2124. 
6.  Greiner and Pattanayak recommend the same caution. See id. at 2197. 
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A. The Study and Findings 
Greiner and Pattanayak measured the impact of offers of legal 
representation from the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau on unemployment 
insurance claimants.7 Under the supervision of clinical faculty, HLAB students 
represent claimants in first-level, de novo appeals of UI benefit denials before 
an administrative law judge. Students conduct intake by telephone, and 
demand for HLAB’s UI services far exceeds capacity.8 During the study, after 
confirming callers’ general eligibility, students submitted potential UI clients 
to Greiner and Pattanayak for randomization.9 On instruction from Greiner 
and Pattanayak within twenty-four hours of the initial conversation, students 
offered callers either representation or referral to other agencies. 
Greiner and Pattanayak designed their study to measure the impact of 
representation by randomizing the only action within HLAB’s control—the 
initial offer of representation. HLAB could not control who accepted its offer, 
who sought help elsewhere, or who decided to do nothing.10 Over a period of 
almost two years, Greiner and Pattanayak randomized more than two hundred 
cases.11 They then compared case outcomes—specifically, benefits awards and 
adjudication time—between those claimants who were offered HLAB 
assistance (the treatment group) and those who were not (the control group). 
With respect to benefits, the treatment group prevailed no more frequently at 
hearings than the control group. However, claimants in the treatment group 
received their benefits decisions on average two weeks later than those in the 
 
7.  HLAB is a highly respected teaching clinic housed in one of the nation’s elite law schools. It 
was founded by law students in 1913 and was one of the first law school clinics of any kind. 
See HARRY SANDICK & JOHN A. FREEDMAN, A HISTORY OF THE HARVARD LEGAL AID BUREAU 
2-4 (1996); Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2140-42. 
8.  Greiner and Pattanayak imply that excessive client demand for services ethically justifies the 
use of randomization. See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2122, 2141; see also D. James 
Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled Legal 
Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 
126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 47), http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1948286 (explicitly stating that “oversubscription makes randomization easily 
permissible”). 
9.  For details on the study’s methodology, see Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2143-44. 
The research protocol, which contained client consent provisions, was approved by the 
Harvard University Institutional Review Board. See id. at 2143 n.95. 
10.  Greiner and Pattanayak devote an entire second introduction of the paper to defending this 
methodological choice. See id. at 2127-32. 
11.  Id. at 2144. 
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control group.12 In other words, claimants who received an offer of assistance 
from HLAB fared no better, and perhaps worse, than those who were turned 
away. 
Greiner and Pattanayak considered a number of explanations for these 
findings. They convincingly reject two hypotheses: first, that low-quality 
(student) lawyering at HLAB was responsible for the results; and second, that 
turned-away claimants obtained help elsewhere at such a high rate that they 
were indistinguishable from HLAB-represented claimants.13 They then identify 
three plausible explanations: first, that the strong personal characteristics or 
case merit of everyone who contacted HLAB muted differences between the 
treatment and control groups; second, that the special efforts of administrative 
law judges to assist self-represented claimants compensated for the lower rate 
of representation in the control group; and third, that the relative simplicity of 
the cases made them especially amenable to self-representation.14 They 
conclude, however, “that without further study with different service providers 
and, perhaps, different study designs, we do not know which of these 
mechanisms (or something else we have not mentioned) is rendering an offer 
of representation unlikely to have resulted in a large effect on win/loss.”15 
B. The Initial Response 
As observed more than forty years ago regarding the challenges of 
mounting an empirical research protocol to study the impact of lawyers in 
delinquency proceedings, “No professional group easily supports research 
which may cast a shadow over its fundamental beliefs and practices.”16 Greiner 
and Pattanayak’s research findings challenge such deeply held beliefs, and the 
legal services and law school clinical communities responded swiftly and 
largely negatively to the study.17 Despite longstanding critiques of deficiencies 
 
12.  See id. at 2153-54. 
13.  See id. at 2172-73. 
14.  See id. at 2173-74. 
15.  Id. at 2174. 
16.  Richard Schwartz, Foreword to W. VAUGHN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF 
YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS, at ix, xii (1972). 
On the “deep resistance to the demystification of expertise,” see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, 
THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 224 (2011). 
17.  See, e.g., David Udell, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ctr. for Access to Justice, Remarks at Panel on 
Empirical Research of Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr., Conference on Constitutional Law (Nov. 5, 
2011), available at http://lawweb.colorado.edu/events/details.jsp?id=3462; Bob Sable, What 
Difference Representation—A Response, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011, 12:10 AM), 
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in client intake and delivery systems,18 failings in caseload control and practice 
routinization,19 and shortcomings in client decisionmaking and lawyer 
accountability,20 most lawyers both inside and outside the academy remain 
certain that representation of indigent clients in civil matters is fundamental to 
the pursuit of justice.21 
Greiner and Pattanayak catalogued the various objections they received, 
most of which focused on research design, and particularly the extent to which 
the study removed lawyer judgment and discretion from case selection.22 We 
describe here a general set of criticisms that we have heard from colleagues.23 
Our purpose is not to debate the relative merits of each criticism—the work 
stands on its own, and the authors can fend for themselves—but to map the 
early reactions. In the subsequent section, we share our affirmative views of the 
study’s import. 
One critique focuses on validity—the study was poorly done, and therefore 
cannot possibly tell us anything useful about what we do. In measuring the 
impact of offers of representation instead of actual representation, Greiner and 
Pattanayak asked the wrong question. We should care only about whether the 
representation itself made a difference, and Greiner and Pattanayak cannot (or 
 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-representation-a-response 
.html; David Udell, What Difference Presentation?, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011, 
8:04 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/03/what-difference-presentation 
.html. 
18.  See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client 
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991). 
19.  See, e.g., Gary Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT’L 
LEGAL AID ASS’N BRIEFCASE 106 (1977); Jeanne Kettleson, Caseload Control, 34 NAT’L LEGAL 
AID ASS’N BRIEFCASE 111 (1977). 
20.  See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Robin Golden & Robert A. Solomon, Who’s in Charge, 
Anyway? A Proposal for Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831 (1998); 
Ann Southworth, Lawyer-Client Decisionmaking in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice: An 
Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Norms, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1101 (1996). 
21.  See Russell Engler, Toward a Context-Based Civil Right to Counsel Through “Access to Justice” 
Initiatives, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196 (2006); Debra Gardner & John Pollock, Civil Right 
to Counsel’s Relationship to Antipoverty Advocacy: Further Reflections, 45 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 
150 (2011); Alan Houseman, The Justice Gap: Civil Legal Assistance Today and Tomorrow, CTR. 
FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/justice 
.pdf. 
22.  Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2201-04. 
23.  Although we heard much of what we describe here directly and discreetly from colleagues, 
some of these criticisms were expressed publicly. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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will not) tell us whether it did.24 Further, in studying the impact of a clinical 
program where most of the services are provided by law students and not 
lawyers, Greiner and Pattanayak picked the wrong site of inquiry. The question 
is whether experienced lawyers, not novices, make a difference.25 Finally, in 
pursuing a randomized, controlled trial not grounded in theory and to the 
exclusion of other empirical methods, Greiner and Pattanayak offer findings 
that are at best partial and at worst misleading. Had the authors fielded their 
study after conducting a literature review (instead of before), they would have 
addressed the more salient issue—namely, the impact of representation by 
lawyers, not the impact an offer of representation by law students.26 
The second critique focuses on tradeoffs—even if something useful can be 
gleaned through research like Greiner and Pattanayak’s, we should not divert 
any of our service resources to such efforts. From 1976 to 1981, the Legal 
Services Corporation (LSC) Research Institute conducted similar studies and 
concluded that staffed field offices were the best way to serve low-income 
clients.27 Even after the research arm was eliminated by Congress, LSC has 
continued to update and improve program evaluation.28 Of course the system 
could be better, but it is not broken. The bottom line, according to the critics, 
is that we should not forego immediate and important services to clients in 
exchange for the distant and uncertain benefits of research. 
The final critique, perhaps underlying all other objections, focuses on 
vulnerability: irrespective of this study’s validity or the tradeoffs involved, why 
would we expose legal services for the poor to further political attack by right-
wing ideologues committed to its destruction? LSC has been subjected to 
relentless assault and existential threats by conservative critics almost since its 
 
24.  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2127-28; see also Pascoe Pleasence, Trials and 
Tribulations: Conducting Randomized Experiments in a Socio-Legal Setting, 35 J.L. & SOC’Y 8, 
17-18 (2008) (making the same methodological choice). 
25.  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2172. One might argue that a low-stakes venue is a 
good one for training law students, but the clinical setting is also suspected of slowing down 
the adjudication process for educational purposes. The study, however, found that 
representation from any source delayed claimants’ receipt of benefits. See id. at 2169-70. 
26.  See Rebecca Sandefur, What Was the Question? Or, Scholarly Conventions and How They Matter, 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Mar. 28, 2011, 10:41 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com 
/archives/2011/03/what-was-the-question-or-scholarly-conventions-and-how-they-matter.html. 
27.  See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 
AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1980). 
28.  Houseman, supra note 21, at 15; Performance Criteria Referenced to the ABA Standards for the 
Provision of Legal Aid, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (2007), http://www.legalaidnc.org/public 
/participate/legal_services_community/LSCPerformanceCriteriaReferencingABAStandards 
_2007edition.pdf. 
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inception. In 1981, President Reagan attempted to eliminate LSC, which 
resulted in a twenty-five percent cut to its budget.29 Fifteen years later, 
Congress enacted further crippling budget cuts (another thirty-three percent) 
and imposed severe program restrictions.30 Even today, the Republican Study 
Committee’s fiscal year 2013 budget proposes eliminating LSC because of its 
“lobbying, advocacy of leftist causes, and litigation against the federal 
government.”31 In such an environment, research—especially anything that 
does not clearly demonstrate the value of legal services—is a naïve luxury we 
cannot afford. 
C. Our Reading 
While we share some of the concerns expressed above, we are neither 
surprised nor especially troubled by Greiner and Pattanayak’s findings. Given 
the particular characteristics of unemployment insurance law, adjudication, 
and claimants, we might guess that lawyers are less important in these cases 
than they are in more complex settings on behalf of clients in greater need. 
Maybe legal representation in the unemployment insurance context is 
unnecessary for some claimants, at least in closely monitored, high-performing 
venues such as the office studied here. The results might also reflect the success 
of sustained individual and institutional advocacy by experienced lawyers 
whose efforts over many decades paved the way for effective self-
representation. More fundamentally, perhaps facilitating effective self-
representation—rather than providing a lawyer for every indigent civil 
litigant—should be a primary goal of the access-to-justice movement. 
Greiner and Pattanayak acknowledge that they “come to no firm 
conclusions regarding a use-of-representation effect on the win rate” in the 
unemployment insurance context.32 And they make no claim about the impact 
 
29.  See ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON BUDGET SAVINGS: FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET REVISIONS, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 97-41, at 362 (1981); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN’S 
BUDGET REVISIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1982, at A-79 (1981). 
30.  Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 
tit. V, § 504, 110 Stat. 1321, 1352-53 (1996). For details on the restrictions, see Michael J. 
Belaen, Change We Need: Why Enacting the Civil Access to Justice Act of 2009 Is Necessary To 
Expand Legal Aid for the Poor, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 329, 366 (2009); and Liza Q. 
Wirtz, The Ethical Bar and the LSC: Wrestling with Restrictions on Federally Funded Legal 
Services, 59 VAND. L. REV. 971, 983-84 (2006). 
31.  Cut, Cap, and Balance: A Budget for Fiscal Year 2013, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM. 15 (2012), 
http://rsc.jordan.house.gov/UploadedFiles/RSC_FY_2013_Budget_Cut_Cap_and 
_Balance_Summary--FINAL.pdf. 
32.  Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2125. 
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of offers or actual representation in other legal settings. But their findings are 
suggestive of important forces at work, including when and where self-
representation might be equal or superior to legal representation, and how the 
role of lawyers might shape such opportunities. 
For example, as Greiner and Pattanayak note, initial appeals by claimants in 
UI cases may be particularly amenable to self-representation. First, outcomes 
in UI cases are binary. The claimant is either awarded or denied benefits. 
Second, pursuing an appeal requires little technical legal knowledge. Evidence 
and procedural rules are relaxed, the agency develops the record prior to the 
hearing, and information about separation from employment—the point on 
which most UI cases turn—is often readily available. Third, the agency in 
general, and some administrative law judges in particular, may be supportive 
of self-representation.33 Finally, people claiming UI benefits may be especially 
well equipped for self-representation, at least relative to many legal services 
clients. UI claimants have recently engaged in formal employment, which may 
correlate with personal attributes and resources that enhance their ability to 
navigate the system with minimal or no help. 
The relatively straightforward nature of UI appeals contrasts with many 
other areas of practice common in legal services offices and law school clinics. 
For instance, when representing a tenant in an eviction case, outcomes typically 
involve a series of complex, interrelated choices between retaining or ceding 
possession, demanding or forgoing specific repairs, and trading off rent due to 
landlords with damages due to tenants.34 In fact, Greiner and Pattanayak 
recently completed a housing study conducted in a Massachusetts District 
Court, which revealed that the offer of representation to tenants by experienced 
lawyers had a strong positive impact on their case outcomes.35 
Greiner and Pattanayak also note that legal advocacy in the Boston UI 
office may have helped to produce claimant-friendly processes.36 Over thirty 
 
33.  Id. at 2123. 
34.  A metastudy of impact-of-counsel research found that the lawyers make a greater difference 
in cases with more procedural complexity. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: 
An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 52 (2010). 
35.  Greiner, Pattanayak & Hennessy, supra note 8. But see D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos 
Pattanayak & Jonathan Philip Hennessy, How Effective Are Limited Legal Assistance Programs? 
A Randomized Experiment in a Massachusetts Housing Court 1-2 (Oct. 23, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1880078 (finding “no statistically significant evidence that the 
service provider’s offer of full, as opposed to limited, representation had a large (or any) 
effect on the likelihood that the occupant would retain possession, on the financial 
consequences of the case, on judicial involvement in or attention to cases, or on any other 
litigation-related outcome of substantive import”). 
36.  Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2198-99. 
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years ago, Gary Bellow suggested that “focused case pressure”—in which 
lawyers and clients bring targeted streams of individual cases—could positively 
and broadly impact institutional players and practices.37 Experienced 
employment lawyers in Boston represent a relatively high volume of UI 
claimants, and they also engage in institutional advocacy. Although no one has 
tested focused case pressure to determine when, where, or how such a strategy 
is effective, Greiner and Pattanayak’s findings may reflect the impact of 
advocates’ sustained work over several decades.38 Additional research may 
show that a UI hearing office not subject to focused case pressure is less 
friendly to self-represented claimants, or we may discover that even a well-
performing agency requires ongoing monitoring by lawyers to prevent 
institutional backsliding. 
Indeed, for reform-minded lawyers, Greiner and Pattanayak’s findings may 
point toward new strategies to influence administrative systems that adjudicate 
the rights of low- and moderate-income people. When these systems are 
subjected to careful and sustained empirical study, we may learn that 
representation focused on program norms, rules, and practices is equally or 
even more effective than impact and test-case litigation. Conceived by civil 
rights lawyers more than a half century ago and adapted by public interest and 
cause lawyers across a spectrum of legal rights campaigns, the traditional 
model of law reform litigation relied largely on anecdote, intuition, and 
pragmatism in making advocacy judgments to target and restructure core 
public institutions such as prisons, schools, and welfare offices.39 Greiner and 
Pattanayak’s findings compel us to consider more exacting evidentiary 
standards in making scarcity-driven decisions about when and how to reform 
institutions. 
i i .  how research can improve legal service delivery, 
inform resource allocation, and increase access to 
justice 
The controversy generated by Greiner and Pattanayak’s study is due in part 
to the void into which it was proffered. Legal services programs and law school 
 
37.  See Bellow, supra note 19, at 121-22; see also Gary Bellow, Steady Work: A Practitioner’s 
Reflections on Political Lawyering, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 297-300 (1996) 
(discussing several successful examples of the strategy of focused case pressure). 
38.  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2198-99. 
39.  See Scott L. Cummings, The Pursuit of Legal Rights—and Beyond, 59 UCLA L. REV. 506 
(2012) (describing the growth and diversification of public interest law, including 
theoretical, organizational, and practical critiques of litigation as a law reform strategy). 
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clinics have served tens of millions of low-income clients since the 1960s, yet 
we lack basic information, let alone rigorous empirical data, about the impact 
of our work. Although we are generally confident about the added value of our 
advocacy, few legal services programs or law school clinics conduct formal 
quality control or evaluate service outcomes, and fewer still have opened their 
practices to external scrutiny.40 In fact, Greiner and Pattanayak exhaustively 
review decades of research purporting to measure the impact of civil 
representation.41 Even as they emphasize that identifying methodological 
research flaws is different from saying the findings are wrong, they conclude 
that almost all prior studies “suffer from methodological problems so severe as 
to render their conclusions untrustworthy.”42 
In this Part, we argue that a robust research program would generate more 
reliable and actionable knowledge relevant to the overlapping dimensions of 
individual representation (service delivery), program design (resource 
allocation), and systemic issues (broader access to justice). In terms of 
individual representation, research can improve service delivery by measuring 
the tangible and intangible benefits that we provide to our clients. For 
individual programs, research can strengthen our understanding of both client 
needs and provider resource-allocation decisions. And at the systemic level, 
research can increase access to justice by strengthening the argument for 
appointed counsel in some civil cases and developing effective nonlawyer or 
less-than-full-representation approaches in others. 
A. Improving Service Delivery to Clients: The Representational Imperative 
Like many professionals, we lawyers are confident about our ability to help 
clients. That confidence may turn out to be well placed, but how would we 
know?43 We select our clients, and we generally make the strategic and tactical 
 
40.  Jeanne Charn, Time for a System Wide Quality Agenda, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Summer 
2004, at 3. Partly in response to concerns about funder-mandated evaluation, the legal 
services field has embarked on “program-owned evaluation.” Martha Bergmark et al., 
“Program Owned Evaluation” as a Leadership and Management Tool in Civil Legal Services 
Programs (Nov. 2003) (unpublished draft), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents 
/1071075437.57/ProgramOwnedEvaluation-draft.pdf. 
41.  See Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2175-84. 
42.  Id. at 2125-26. The common problems plaguing all but two prior studies include ill-defined 
interventions, multiple layers of selection bias, and lack of statistical significance. Id. at 2175-
84. 
43.  See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability To Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133 (2010) (finding in a national study that lawyers 
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decisions in their cases.44 We manage client demand and expectations, triage 
access to our services, and counsel clients about what is possible and 
desirable.45 Very few lay clients have the knowledge or experience to challenge 
our advice, and even fewer clients have the ability to reject it or to go elsewhere. 
In such a closed system, it is easy to misjudge our impact.46 Empirical research 
can help us better understand what effect, both material and nonmaterial, we 
actually have on our clients’ lives. 
For decades, LSC field offices have reported the numbers and types of cases 
they handle as well as some process data, such as whether a case involves only 
counsel and advice or whether it is resolved by settlement with or without a 
hearing.47 However, LSC does not require field offices to report substantive 
outcomes, and non-LSC programs and law school clinics infrequently collect 
such data. Nor do we obtain meaningful feedback from clients. To the extent 
that programs solicit such input, it is typically through “client satisfaction 
surveys” distributed at the end of representation. These surveys are rarely 
developed in consultation with social scientists or other experts and are not 
generally representative, reliable, or valid indicators of service quality. Without 
well-designed research to provide objective and credible evaluation of our 
efforts, we have no basis to compare different full-representation models with 
each other or with less-than-full representation or nonrepresentation 
alternatives.48 
Beyond scorekeeping and client satisfaction surveys, research can help us 
learn more about the socioeconomic benefits we deliver to clients. If the goal of 
an income-support collaborative is to help clients who are unable to work or 
obtain disability benefits, we should track how many of our clients moved from 
welfare to Supplemental Security Income benefits—with the resulting increase 
 
are overconfident in their litigation-outcome predictions, even in the face of debiasing 
techniques). 
44.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010) (specifying that clients establish the 
ends of representation, while lawyers determine the means). 
45.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Robert G. Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services: 
Individual Attorney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 237 (1983). 
46.  See Gary Bellow, Management of Legal Services: Legal Aid in the United States, 14 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 343 (1980). See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 16 (describing the 
cognitive biases that result in overconfidence of thinking and intuitive judgment, especially 
in irregular, low-validity clinical environments). 
47.  See, e.g., Fact Book 2010, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., at 23-28 (2011), http://www.lsc.gov/sites 
/default/files/LSC/pdfs/LSC_2010_Fact_Book.pdf (reporting data for 2010). 
48.  Greiner and Pattanayak’s subsequent study of landlord-tenant cases in a Massachusetts 
District Court makes such a comparison between limited scope and full representation. 
Greiner, Pattanayak & Hennessy, supra note 8, at 2-5. 
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in household income—as a result of our advocacy.49 If the goal of a foreclosure 
prevention project is to maintain home ownership for moderate-income 
families, we should collect data on how many of our clients remained in their 
homes at the end of our assistance.50 If the goal of a community reentry 
program is to help people with criminal records overcome barriers to 
employment, we should follow up to learn whether our clients’ earnings 
increased after our intervention. 
We can also learn more about our effectiveness over time. Some of our 
work is analogous to emergency room or trauma care—e.g., trying to stop an 
imminent eviction or helping someone access emergency food stamps—while 
some of it is more preventive or capacity-building in nature. In the former case, 
we might not expect the benefits of our services to extend much beyond the 
initial intervention. In the latter case, longitudinal studies would be the only 
way to determine whether we are achieving our service goals. If, after 
preventing foreclosure in the first instance, we learn that many of our clients 
lose their homes to foreclosure within twelve to twenty-four months, we might 
rethink our service delivery model (or at least our aspirations for it). 
And beyond material benefits, what else do we provide clients? Pecuniary 
success at a hearing, as noted by Greiner and Pattanayak, may not be the only 
goal of representation.51 Dignity interests, such as the experience of being 
heard or taking a stand, can be defined and measured.52 Some of these less 
tangible benefits may be inextricably linked with material benefits. For 
example, expunging a client’s conviction may reduce stigma and increase her 
confidence in job interviews, which together with a clean record would 
improve her employment prospects.53 
 
49.  See, e.g., Edward Barnes & Liam Galbreth, E. Bay Cmty. Law Ctr., Lifting Welfare Employment 
Sanctions in the CalWORKs Program: The Experience of the Family Advocacy and Services Team 
(FAST), CALEGALADVOCATES.ORG (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.calegaladvocates.org 
/library/attachment.76054 (evaluating the experience of FAST’s nonprofit work from July 
2000 to July 2001). 
50.  See Jeanne Charn, Preventing Foreclosure: Do Clients Who Win Their Cases Keep Their 
Houses? (Jan. 19, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
51.  Greiner & Pattanayak, supra note 3, at 2205-06. 
52.  Dignity interests have been studied in medicine for the purpose of improving end-of-life 
care. See, e.g., Harvey Max Cochinov et al., The Patient Dignity Inventory: A Novel Way of 
Measuring Dignity-Related Distress in Palliative Care, 36 J. PAIN & SYMPTOM MGMT. 559 
(2008). 
53.  See Monique W. Morris, Michael Sumner & Jessica Z. Borja, A Higher Hurdle: Barriers to 
Employment for Formerly Incarcerated Women, THELTON E. HENDERSON CTR. FOR SOC. 
JUSTICE (Dec. 2008), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/A_Higher_Hurdle_December_2008 
%281%29.pdf. 
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Research can also reveal hidden costs of self-representation, such as anxiety 
or stress imposed on successful as well as unsuccessful claimants. Those whose 
claims are denied may be less likely to accept the adverse result if they did not 
have legal assistance.54 On the other hand, claimants who self-represent may 
gain confidence in themselves, in claimant-initiated institutional reform, and in 
the legal system. They may be more likely to assert claims in the future and 
may be better informed and better able to seek the legal advice they need. 
These examples are not meant to be exhaustive, nor do we mean to suggest 
that measuring such costs and benefits will be a simple matter. Studying 
material outcomes alone may miss important psychosocial benefits of various 
forms of representation, and nonmaterial goals and outcomes typically turn on 
normative judgments, not empirical ones.55 
B.  Informing Resource Allocation Decisions: The Programmatic Imperative 
Resource-allocation decisions in legal services run the gamut from societal 
choices, such as annual LSC appropriations, to individual decisions, such as 
which case a lawyer prioritizes on any given day. At the office level, programs 
make two related distributive decisions about gatekeeping, or who gets in the 
door, and about scope, or how much service we offer to people we screen in.56 
Many of these decisions are based on assumptions about client needs. 
Empirical research can better inform us both about client needs (demand side) 
and about the range of services we should offer (supply side). 
On the demand side, based largely on studies conducted decades ago, the 
conventional wisdom is that at least four out of five of the legal needs of the 
 
54.  The procedural-justice literature tells us that participants’ experience in the system is 
determined in part by whether they feel they were treated fairly. See Tom R. Tyler, What Is 
Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens To Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988). 
55.  See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 82-97 (2002) 
(noting the difficultly of assessing the validity of measurements, particularly of inherently 
normative judgments); see also Alon Harel & Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two 
Yet-To-Be-Met Challenges for Law and Economics, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 749 (2011) (discussing 
the failure of law and economics to explain specific normative decisions). See generally 
RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS (Henry E. Brady & 
David Collier eds., 2d ed. 2010) (providing a variety of perspectives on and criticisms of the 
status quo in social science research). 
56.  See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 1. 
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poor go unmet.57 Recent LSC reports, relying on a mix of nonscientific 
methods, reach roughly the same conclusion.58 Such studies are undertaken for 
the admirable purpose of highlighting the justice gap—the difference between 
the legal needs of the poor and our ability to meet them. But as a programmatic 
matter, they tell us almost nothing about the range of client needs nor how to 
allocate existing resources among legal assistance, nonlegal assistance, and 
other forms of advice and dispute resolution. 
Pioneering research in the United Kingdom suggests that many consumers 
prefer alternatives to lawyer-centric services.59 Similarly, in the United States, 
consumer surveys and anecdotal evidence from attorneys who offer limited-
scope assistance indicate that even clients who could afford traditional lawyer 
services sometimes prefer a more active role in their cases and experience 
higher satisfaction with more flexible and limited arrangements with lawyers.60 
The point is that more robust and sophisticated research can tell us not only 
about clients’ needs, but also about their preferences for how and from whom 
they might get the most help.61 
 
57.  AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE LOW-INCOME PUBLIC: FINDINGS OF 
THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994); BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS 
OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY (1977). 
58.  Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income 
Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.legalaidnc.org/public 
/learn/publications/Documenting%20the%20Justice%20Gap/DocumentingtheJustice%20Gap_
Update _FINAL_Sept_30_09.pdf. 
59.  See PASCOE PLEASENCE ET AL., LEGAL SERVS. COMM’N, CAUSES OF ACTION: CIVIL ACTION AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 2006); Rebecca L. Sandefur & Jeanne Charn, Class and Advice Seeking: 
Comparative Insights (Mar. 3, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ilagnet 
.org/conf_2009/papers/Class%20and%20Advice%20Seeking%20%20Comparative%20Insights 
%20%28RS%20and%20JC%29.pdf; Hazel Genn et al., Understanding Advice Seeking 
Behaviour: Further Findings from the LSRC Survey of Justiciable Problems, LEGAL SERVS. RES. 
CENTRE (2004), http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Understanding_Advice_Seeking 
_Behaviour_LSRC_2004.pdf. 
60.  See, e.g., Bruce D. Sales et. al., Is Self-Representation a Reasonable Alternative to Attorney 
Representation in Divorce Cases?, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 553, 576-88 (1993) (presenting a study 
indicating that self-represented family law litigants report a high rate of satisfaction); Liz 
Pejeau, Limited Scope Representation: Making Representation Affordable . . . and Ethical, 
ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Oct. 2006, at 38 (noting that many self-represented litigants seeking 
limited attorney assistance are interested in retaining increased control over their cases); 
John M. Greacen, Self-Represented Litigants and Court and Legal Services Responses to Their 
Needs: What We Know, CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CTS. (2003), http://www.courts.ca.gov 
/partners/documents/SRLwhatweknow.pdf (providing an overview of studies on self-
represented litigants). 
61.  Research suggests that many Americans do not resolve civil justice problems with lawyers or 
in tribunals. See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and 
Non-Legal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 949, 969 (2009); Rebecca L. 
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On the supply side, every legal services office and law school clinical 
program applies filters to allocate scarce service resources, such as geography, 
income, case type, health status, age, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and 
other eligibility criteria. Once clients get through the door, we may provide a 
range of services along a continuum from advice and counsel to limited scope 
legal assistance (unbundling) to full lawyer representation.62 In the last fifteen 
years, innovative service-delivery models have proliferated, such as hotlines for 
information and advice, court-assistance programs to aid self-represented 
parties, and web-based services. Though the variety of service methods has 
grown substantially, we have done little to figure out what type of help best 
meets each client’s particular needs. When we refer clients for limited 
assistance, we do so often because representation is not available, not because 
we know with any certainty that it is a reliably effective option. 
Greiner and Pattanayak’s work suggests—even if we do not know exactly 
why—that some claimants can successfully represent themselves.63 Moreover, 
it raises the very real possibility that with further study we could identify who 
is likely to succeed on their own or with limited advice and who needs more 
extensive assistance. More nuanced research can provide valuable information 
at the intersection of supply and demand. Are there subsets of clients—e.g., 
language minorities, the disabled, or the elderly—who need a different level of 
assistance than other clients? Are there characteristics of claims—novel issues 
or ambiguities in existing laws or routines—that make self-representation less 
effective? Are there certain dispute-processing venues—administrative 
tribunals, jury trials, appellate proceedings—that are more or less friendly to 
claimants who self-represent or have limited assistance from lawyers?64 Such 
research could fuel a more efficient and effective use of resources, a more 
 
Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems and Responses of Inaction, in 
TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 1, 113 (Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007). 
62.  See Mary Helen McNeal, Report of the Working Group on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1819 (1999). 
63.  The idea that some clients can effectively represent themselves in certain settings is not new. 
See, e.g., Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, Project, The Unauthorized Practice of Law 
and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104 (1976) (establishing that some pro 
se litigants can effectively represent themselves with limited assistance). 
64.  Three decades ago, the Civil Litigation Research Project, funded by the Department of 
Justice, studied the relative merits of courts as dispute-processing venues, generating a 
considerable literature from which a new research agenda can draw both substantive and 
methodological lessons. See DAVID M. TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT 
FINAL REPORT (1983); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Bibliography of Publications and Papers of 
the Civil Litigation Research Project, U. OF WIS.-MADISON (last updated Dec. 28, 2004), 
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/clrpbib.htm (listing publications produced by 
the project). 
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consumer-driven delivery system, and greater transparency and accountability 
in the crucial gatekeeping and scope decisions that all providers must make. 
C.  Increasing Access to Justice: The Systemic Imperative 
At the systemic level, access-to-justice advocates have sought an 
entitlement to court-appointed legal representation in civil matters mirroring 
the right to assistance in criminal matters enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
Gideon v. Wainwright.65 In its strongest form, so-called civil Gideon would 
require states to provide lawyers to virtually all civil litigants who cannot afford 
counsel.66 In a more modest form, indigent litigants would be entitled to 
lawyers at government expense for a subset of cases with core rights at stake.67 
As a constitutional matter, the Supreme Court has made clear that any 
mandated right to counsel in civil cases requires evidence that nothing less than 
appointed legal representation will safeguard procedural rights and prevent 
error.68 
Alongside the normatively focused right-to-counsel movement, as noted 
above, we have seen the rapid expansion of localized, pragmatic, bottom-up 
innovations in nonlawyer and less-than-full-service assistance. The self-help or 
pro se movement aims to support litigants to represent themselves. Court 
simplification efforts are designed to reduce barriers to unrepresented parties. 
Where court procedures cannot be simplified and self-help is inadequate, lay 
advocacy or limited-scope representation by lawyers is prescribed.69 While the 
impetus for many of these developments was to provide a stopgap until lawyer 
 
65.  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
66.  For an overview of civil Gideon, see Russell Engler, Shaping a Context-Based Civil Gideon 
From the Dynamics of Social Change, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 697 (2006); and Clare 
Pastore, A Civil Right to Counsel: Closer to Reality?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1065 (2009). 
67.  See Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal 
About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37 (2010). 
68.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (applying the balancing test proffered 
by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to hold that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent litigants 
in parental-termination proceedings); see also Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1309 (2012) (arguing that the constitutional adequacy of due process safeguards 
must evolve with the facts and circumstances of administrative adjudication). 
69.  See COMM’N ON NONLAWYER PRACTICE, AM. BAR ASS’N, NONLAWYER ACTIVITY IN LAW-
RELATED SITUATIONS: A REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1995); DEBORAH L. RHODE, 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE 89-91 (2004). 
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services could be expanded, they have become significant features of the access-
to-justice landscape in their own right.70 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Turner v. Rogers may significantly 
alter this landscape.71 Turner is the first civil right-to-counsel case to reach the 
Court in thirty years. The question in Turner was whether a low-income father 
facing jail time for failure to pay child support in a civil contempt proceeding 
was entitled to a court-appointed lawyer.72 Because the risk of incarceration has 
been a deciding factor in criminal and juvenile right-to-counsel cases, civil 
Gideon advocates believed they had a strong claim.73 While a five-to-four 
majority of the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant’s due process rights 
had been violated, not a single Justice found a constitutional entitlement to 
counsel.74 Instead, the Court held that court-aided self-representation would 
have been sufficient to ensure petitioner Michael Turner’s due process rights.75 
 
70.  See, e.g., Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: The Emerging Consensus and Some Questions and 
Implications, 94 JUDICATURE 156, 156-57 (2011) (describing the four key access-to-justice 
elements as “court simplification and services, bar flexibility, legal aid efficiency and 
availability, and system of triage and assignment”). 
71.  131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011). 
72.  Both parties referenced the Greiner and Pattanayak study in their briefs. The respondents’ 
brief stated: “Lawyers are unlikely to make a substantial difference in these simple 
proceedings. A recent randomized, controlled Harvard study of simple, nonjury litigation 
found no significant difference in success rates between litigants who were offered legal 
representation and those who were not.” Brief of Respondents at 54-55, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 
2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 481836. The petitioner’s brief replied: “Respondents cite a study 
for the proposition that lawyers are unlikely to make a difference, but as its authors concede, 
the study is ‘useless’ for determining the value of legal representation.” Reply Brief for 
Petitioner at 16 n.11, Turner, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (No. 10-10), 2011 WL 805230 (citation omitted). 
73.  In Lassiter, the Court—in holding that there is no right to appointed counsel in cases 
involving termination of parental rights—noted a “presumption that there is a right to 
appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal 
freedom.” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
74.  Turner, 131 U.S. at 2520. 
75.  Id. The Justices themselves seem concerned with the existence of data or empirical evidence. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 23-24, Turner, 131 U.S. 2507 (No. 10-10) (question of 
Justice Kennedy) (requesting data about how often counsel appears in child-support 
contempt cases); id. at 30 (question of Justice Ginsburg) (asking for a jurisdiction where a 
“less than counsel” procedure has been instituted); id. at 50 (question of Justice Breyer) 
(asking for data on gender disparity in lawyers and stating that “[t]here must be some 
organization that’s studied that”); id. at 53-54 (question of Justice Ginsburg) (asking 
whether anyone has computed how expensive counsel would be as opposed to confinement 
costs). 
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Civil Gideon advocates reacted with a combination of dismay and cautious 
optimism.76 Some scholars and clinicians involved in the case applauded the 
outcome and called for increased pro se reform.77 Yet, regardless of one’s 
normative views, after Turner, the route to court-ordered civil Gideon will 
require research that compares lawyer representation to less expensive 
alternatives.78 In fact, during oral argument, three of the five Justices in the 
Turner majority specifically requested data as they sought to weigh due process 
considerations.79 As one leading commentator recently observed about Turner 
and the challenge of determining when lawyers are constitutionally required, 
“[w]hile one can state the equation, one cannot do the math because the data 
are missing.”80 Thus, for national right-to-counsel advocates and local 
innovators, developing a sizable, credible, and independent research capacity 
has become not just a good idea but an urgent necessity. 
Indeed, an empirical study such as Greiner and Pattanayak’s invites a more 
fundamental reassessment of the place of self-representation in the access-to-
justice movement.81 Self-help can mitigate concerns that professionals in 
general and legal services lawyers in particular create unnecessary and 
unwarranted dependency.82 Lawyers should be available when our expertise 
makes a difference, and we should play a more limited role, if any, when other 
forms of representation are equally or more effective.83 From this perspective, 
self-help is not a second-best alternative until everyone can have a lawyer. 
Rather, we should aspire to a justice system in which people with “the legal 
 
76.  See Symposium (Turner v. Rogers), CONCURRING OPINIONS, http://www.concurringopinions.com 
/archives/category/symposium-turner-v-rogers (last visited June 24, 2012). 
77.  Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se 
Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 970-71 (2012). 
78.  The case will also present new challenges and opportunities for an over-taxed judiciary. See 
Richard Zorza, The Implications of Turner v. Rogers: A New Day for Judges and the Self-
Represented, 50 JUDGES’ J. 16 (2011). 
79.  See supra note 75. 
80.  Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 158 (2011). 
81.  Thoughtful commentators are already imagining what an access-maximizing system might 
look like in the post-Turner world. See, e.g., Richard Zorza, The Access to Justice “Sorting 
Hat”: Towards a System of Triage and Intake that Maximizes Access and Outcomes (2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
82.  See Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1053 (1970). 
83.  See Richard Moorhead & Pascoe Pleasence, Access to Justice After Universalism: Introduction, 
30 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 2-3 (2003). 
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problems of everyday life” can obtain fair and prompt dispute resolution on 
their own or with limited assistance.84 
i i i .  the time is  right for a robust research agenda 
Greiner and Pattanayak’s work comes at an opportune time to develop and 
pursue a more robust legal services research agenda. First, there are important 
changes afoot in law schools and the service professions that provide fertile 
ground for empirical inquiry. Second, we have unprecedented infrastructure to 
support the growth of such research, including more than a thousand law 
school clinics, which can serve as laboratories to ask and answer important 
delivery, allocation, and efficacy questions. Finally, the policy marketplace is 
increasingly evidence-driven—at the most basic level, providers, policymakers, 
and funders want to know what works. In fact, it is difficult to imagine that we 
can garner significantly more funding without much better data.85 
In recent years, law school faculties have become more methodologically 
diverse, with a proliferation of scholarly approaches that complement the 
traditional doctrinal core, including interdisciplinary studies, policy-focused 
research, and empirical legal studies. Of these developments, the most salient 
for our purposes is the rise of empiricism. This new empiricism comes in at 
least two distinct but related forms, both of which offer lenses through which 
we can better understand the service delivery, resource allocation, and access-
to-justice dimensions of our work.86 Likewise, other service professions have 
increasingly applied the use of best evidence to inform daily practice, especially 
evidence-based medicine, which has been adopted by the public and private 
sectors and is reflected in professional education.87 From these sister 
 
84.  Ab Currie, The Legal Problems of Everyday Life, in 12 SOCIOLOGY OF CRIME, LAW, AND 
DEVIANCE: ACCESS TO JUSTICE 1 (Rebecca Sandefur ed., 2009). 
85.  Jeffrey Selbin, Josh Rosenthal & Jeanne Charn, Access to Evidence: How an Evidence-Based 
Delivery System Can Improve Legal Aid for Low- and Moderate-Income Americans, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS (2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/06/pdf/evidence.pdf. 
86.  Empirical Legal Studies is a positivist-quantitative strand often associated with law and 
economics; the New Legal Realism is an interpretivist-qualitative strand often associated 
with socio-legal studies. See Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on 
the Market for “Empirical Legal Studies,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2008, at 17, 23, 31-
32; Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword, Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
335, 336, 340. 
87.  See, e.g., Gordon Guyatt et al., Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Approach to Teaching the 
Practice of Medicine, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2420 (1992); David L. Sackett et al., Evidence 
Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BMJ 71, 71 (1996) (defining evidence-based 
medicine as “the conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
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professions we can learn some of the potential and limits of evidence-based 
approaches.88 
While these trends in law schools and the service professions provide the 
expertise and examples to develop an evidence-based legal services delivery 
system, law school clinics can serve as primary sites of such inquiry.89 
Established in many cases as marginal, oppositional practices with an explicit 
social-justice mission, clinics have become institutionalized in the nation’s law 
schools to a degree almost unimaginable to their founders.90 During the last 
forty years, clinics have both contributed to the hands-on educational needs of 
law students and mitigated the persistent justice gap for low-income clients 
and community groups.91 Clinicians have pioneered a wide array of service-
delivery methods, and clinics are well positioned to serve as research sites. 
Clinics have access to clients, courts, and other institutional actors. They 
operate within law schools full of potential research collaborators—it is no 
coincidence that Greiner and Pattanayak’s first study was conducted in 
partnership with a law school clinic—and they can leverage the additional 
labor, expertise, and requisite detachment of social scientists within larger 
research universities.92 
Multiple nodes of complementary legal services research activity have 
emerged in recent years. Under new leadership, the Legal Services Corporation 
has begun to commission studies to get a better handle on current needs, 
 
decisions about the care of individual patients” through “integrating individual clinical 
expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from systematic research”). 
88.  See, e.g., W.A. Rogers, Evidence-Based Medicine and Justice: A Framework for Looking at the 
Impact of EBM upon Vulnerable or Disadvantaged Groups, 30 J. MED. ETHICS 141 (offering a 
social justice critique of evidence-based medicine); Mark R. Tonelli, The Limits of Evidence-
Based Medicine, 46 RESPIRATORY CARE 1435 (2001) (arguing that clinical experience differs in 
kind, not degree, from empirical evidence and should be equally valued in medical decision-
making). 
89.  Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Lab Office (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.nyls.edu/user_files/1/3/4/15/1009/ClinicLabOffice.pdf. See generally Donald A. 
Schön, Knowing-in-Action: The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology, 2 CHANGE 27, 
29 (1995) (arguing that law practice is “a setting not only for the application of knowledge 
but for its generation”). 
90.  Rebecca L. Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 57 (2009). 
91.  See David A. Santacroce & Robert R. Kuehn, The 2010-11 Survey of Applied Legal Education, 
CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUC. (2012), http://www.csale.org/files/CSALE 
.Report.on.2010-11.Survey.5.16.12.Revised.pdf. 
92.  Jeanne Charn & Jeffrey Selbin, Legal Aid, Law School Clinics and the Opportunity for Joint 
Gain, MGMT. INFO. EXCHANGE J., Winter 2007, at 28. 
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activities, and expenditures.93 In 2010, the Department of Justice established an 
Access to Justice Initiative, and one of its primary goals is to “[e]xpand 
research on innovative strategies to close the gap between the need for, and the 
availability of, quality legal assistance.”94 Outside the federal government, the 
American Bar Foundation hired a prominent socio-legal scholar to direct a new 
access-to-justice research initiative.95 In 2011, faculty from leading law 
schools—in collaboration with the Department of Justice and the American Bar 
Foundation—established a consortium to support and produce high-quality 
research on issues of importance to the legal services and access-to-justice 
fields.96 
These initiatives will take on even greater salience in tight budget times. 
Policymakers are increasingly demanding evidence of efficacy to fund new or 
existing social programs. The Government Accounting Office and the Office of 
Management and Budget have examined a wide range of evaluation methods. 
Those offices have called for greater investment in program evaluation and 
recommend prioritizing programs backed by strong evidence.97 Federal 
funding will be directed toward programs for which success can be measured 
and rigorously evaluated—where practical and ethical—by random assignment 
of clients to service and control groups.98 State legislatures, foundations, and 
other funders have likewise begun to insist upon such demonstrable 
 
93.  See, e.g., REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT (2011) (conducting the 
first-ever national study of the availability of civil legal services). 
94.  The Access to Justice Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atj (last visited 
June 24, 2012); see also Laura K. Abel, Evidence-Based Access to Justice, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 295 (2010) (discussing the need for increased empirical research to better target 
various access-to-justice interventions). 
95.  For an example of the potential of the new American Bar Foundation initiative, see 
SANDEFUR & SMYTH, supra note 93. 
96.  Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: An Agenda for Legal Education and Research, 61 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. (forthcoming 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1903769. 
97.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-30, PROGRAM EVALUATIONS: A VARIETY OF 
RIGOROUS METHODS CAN HELP IDENTIFY EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS (2009); Peter Orszag, 
Building Rigorous Evidence To Drive Policy, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (June 8, 2009, 8:39 AM), 
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outcomes.99 To maintain and expand upon our current resources, we have little 
choice but to facilitate and participate in more rigorous scrutiny of our work.100 
conclusion 
So what does it mean to engage in such inquiry, and how might we begin 
to work more closely with researchers? We suggest several related and 
mutually reinforcing activities. First, we should acquire basic literacy in 
empirical methods so that we can communicate more effectively with 
researchers and interpret and apply research more wisely. Second, we should 
explicitly articulate our service goals to determine which processes and 
outcomes can be measured—and thus inform delivery and allocation 
decisions—and which judgments can only be made through clinical experience. 
Finally, and foundationally, we should commit ourselves “to a continuing 
effort to generate alternative methods, to put into operation whatever 
recommends itself to our objective appraisal, and to evaluate remorselessly our 
fondest pet notions.”101 Such literacy, transparency, and open-mindedness are 
keys to advancing knowledge in the field. 
There are many obvious challenges associated with the pursuit of a robust 
research agenda. As noted above, stakeholder resistance to research is 
inevitable. In addition, it will be no small task to identify new resources and to 
 
99.  See, e.g., Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV. CODE § 68651(b)(5) (West 2011); 
Assembly Bill No. 590, 2009-2010 Sen., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009), available at 
http://leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_0551-0600/ab_590_bill_20091011_chaptered.pdf; 
Sean Stannard-Stockton, The Rise of Evidence-Based Grantmaking, TACTICAL PHILANTHROPY 
(May 11, 2010, 8:29 AM), http://www.tacticalphilanthropy.com/2010/05/the-rise-of-evidence 
-based-grantmaking; see also Ashley Allen, Investing for Impact: Innovations in Measurement 
and Evaluation, PHILANTHROPY NEWS DIGEST (Sept. 28, 2011) http://foundationcenter.org 
/pnd/impact/impact_item.jhtml?id=355100010 (discussing the development of evidence-
based systems to guide grantmaking). But see Garry W. Jenkins, Who’s Afraid of 
Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753, 786 (2011) (sounding a note of caution 
about the rising emphasis on metrics-based and results-oriented giving, which can 
undermine philanthropic values and discourage individual and government giving). 
100.  For example, the Center for American Progress has established a “Doing What Works” 
project to encourage the evaluation of government programs’ effectiveness and the 
corresponding investment of resources. See Doing What Works, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/projects/doing_what_works (last visited June 24, 2012). 
101.  Frank Michelman, The Legal Profession and Social Change: The Challenge to the Law Schools, in 
THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967: PROCEEDINGS AND PAPERS AT THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 
CONVOCATION HELD ON THE ONE-HUNDRED FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS FOUNDING 125, 
128 (Arthur E. Sutherland ed., 1968) (referring to Harvard Law School’s Community Legal 
Assistance Office, established in the fall of 1966 as a demonstration project funded by the 
federal Office of Economic Opportunity). 
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map research demands onto existing obligations of time, money, and expertise 
in legal services and clinical programs. And partnering with research colleagues 
from inside the academy and clients from outside the gates will not be easy, 
especially if we want to collaborate in the planning, implementation, and 
dissemination of research. 
The Greiner and Pattanayak study coincides with a moment of crisis in 
American law and society, as exhibited by rising rates of poverty and 
inequality. This widening crisis is exacerbated by deteriorating conditions in 
public access to courts and legal representation. High-quality research offers a 
valuable opportunity to understand and improve local and institutional 
responses to this growing crisis.102 Greiner and Pattanayak should prompt us 
to reflect on our representational models, distributive choices, and systemic-
access efforts. Indeed, in these lean times, evidence of efficacy may be our best 
hope of attracting more human and financial capital to our vital work. Legal 
services lawyers and clinical law teachers should seize this opportunity with the 
same passion, ingenuity, and integrity that we have devoted to the cause of 
justice since the inception of our modern movements more than four decades 
ago. 
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